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Insurance
By RICHARD H. UNDERWOOD*
INTRODUCTION

This Survey will examine recent Kentucky decisions on insurance law issues, and comment on the latest crop of cases relating
to the application and construction of the Kentucky Motor Vehicle Reparations Act (MVRA).' In addition, this Survey will discuss
proposed unfair claims settlement practices legislation, which is
once again generating interest in the Commonwealth. 2
I.

UNFAIR CLAIMS SETTLEMENT PRACTICES

Recently, a trend toward judicial expansion of the tort of "insurer's bad faith" has developed. 3 In addition, there has been
widespread adoption of parallel legislation defining "unfair claims
4
settlement practices."
As early as 1947 the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) drafted a Model Unfair Trade Practices Act.
A successor Model Act was adopted in 1971.1 At last count, thirtytwo states had adopted the Act in whole or in part. 6 While some
insurers may view the proliferation of such statutes with alarm,
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Kentucky. B.S. 1969, J.D. 1976, Ohio
State University.
I For other recent Surveys of Kentucky insurance law see Savage, Kentucky Law
Survey-Insurance, 66 Ky. L.J. 631 (1977-78); Straub, Kentucky Law Survey-Insurance,
68 Ky. L.J. 587 (1979-80); Underwood, Kentucky Law Survey-Insurance, 70 Ky. L.J. 255
(1981-82).
2 Such legislation was nearly enacted in the last session of the General Assembly and
a recommendation was recently made that the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) Model Law be prefiled for consideration in the 1984 session. Letter from
Patrick Watts, Esq., Counsel, Department of Insurance (Aug. 2, 1983). The new bill in
the legislature is currently referred to as 84-BR-237 (1984), and is sponsored by Representatives Cline and Foster.
See Underwood, The Doctor and His Lawyer: Conflicts of Interest, 30 U. KAN.
L. REv. 385 (1982), reprinted in 32 DEF. L.J. 25 (1983).
4 See Best, Statutes andRegulations ControllingLife and Health Insurance Claims
Practices, 29 DEF. L.J. 115 (1980) for a valuable survey of the subject.
Id. at 152-61 app.
Id. at 117-18. Best notes that six additional states have adopted non-uniform legislation, and that other states have proceeded by way of administrative regulations. Id. at 120-26.

KENTUCKY LAW

JoJuRNA[

[Vol. 72

other commentators have advanced more balanced, if qualified,
views. For example, an "insider" in the insurance industry recently
opined:
[A]bsent the availability of severe sanctions for a single violation of a single prohibition, the long list of disapproved practices is more of a helpful guide to pitfalls to be avoided than it
is a threat. Some insurers may be engaging in prohibited practices without having considered the inappropriateness of the practice. A review of the list would ... improve the quality of the
insurer's claim administration. Even though some practices may
be fbrohibited in a State in which the insurer does no business,
avoiding those practices could reduce consumer complaints and
lawsuits. In addition, compliance with all those rules should go
a long way toward eliminating any chance of behaving in such
a way as would be construed to justify an award of punitive
damages.7
On the other hand, the "availability of severe sanctions for a
single violation of a single prohibition" probably led to the demise
of House Bill 360, the proposed Kentucky Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act, which failed to clear a Senate committee after
approval by the House in the last session of the General Assembly.
The "unfair claims settlement practices" prohibited by House
Bill 360 are similar to those set forth in the Model Act, which will
be considered in the 1984 session as Bill 84-BR-237.9 However,
House Bill 360 contained several interesting and controversial
subsections which are not contained in the new proposal. Unfortunately, the deletion of these subsections may simply shift the most
controversial questions concerning such legislation from the
legislature to the courts.
Section 1(3) of House Bill 360 contained a list of thirteen "unfair claims settlement practices" in subsections (a) through (m).
These subsections correspond to numbered subsections of the act
now under consideration. The only differences between the types
of practices listed in the old and new proposals is the inclusion of
Id. at 151.
H.R. 360, 1982 Reg. Sess. (introduced by Rep. Jim LeMaster).
Compare 84-BR-234 with Uniform Claims Settlement Practice Model Regulation, reprinted in Best, supra note 4, at 162-66 app.
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one additional "unfair act" in the new proposal," ° and the deletion of a catch-all prohibiting "any other act or practice in connection with claims settlement which is unfair or deceptive.""
A.

Old Wine In A New Bottle?

At least one of the practices listed in these proposed acts is
already grounds for imposing extracontractual liability on insurers
under Kentucky law. A number of other listed practices have some
counterpart in Kentucky statutes or case law. Accordingly, many
of the legislatively defined "unfair practices" should generate little
controversy. Consider the following "unfair claims settlement practices" listed in both House Bill 360 (lettered), and proposed bill
84-BR-237 (numbered):
(f)(6) Not attempt in good faith to effectuate prompt, fair
and equitable settlement of claims in which liability has become
reasonably clear;
(h)(8) Attempt to settle a claim for less than the amount to
which a reasonable person would have believed he was entitled
by reference to written or printed advertising material accompanying or made part of an application;
(i)(9) Attempt to settle on the basis of an application which
was altered without notice to or knowledge or consent of the
insured;
At least with regard to third party claims, the first of the above
subsections reflects established Kentucky case law regarding the
consequences of an insurer's failure to exercise good faith in
deciding whether to litigate or settle an action in which a plaintiff's claims exceed the policy limits (the so-called "excess case").I2
A "bad faith" refusal to settle the third party plaintiff's tort claim
against the insured may result in the insurer's liability for the judgment, not only up to the policy limits, but also for any excess judg-

See 84-BR-237 § 1(12).
H.R. 360, supra note 8, at § I(n).
, See, e.g., Manchester Ins. & Indem. Co. v. Grundy, 531 S.W.2d 493 (Ky. 1975).
For a discussion of Grundy see Comment, Wrongful Refusal to Settle: The Implications
of Grundy in Kentucky, 65 Ky. L.J. 220 (1976-77).
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Moreover, the acts add little that

is new by suggesting that a wrongful refusal to settle a first party
claim (i.e., an insured's claim under a life, property, health, or
disability insurance policy) is also "unfair," ' 4 although Kentucky
courts have been reluctant to recognize extracontractual liability
in the context of first party claims."5
The second of the above subsections is consistent with the re-

cent decision in ContinentalCasualty Co. v. Smith,1 6 in which ambiguous promotional materials induced an insurance applicant to
believe that the income from her business was insured, as opposed
to her individual wage or salary.' 7 In the course of holding that
the pamphlets and fliers supplied by the insurer should be deemed

part of the policy, the court observed that "tlo hold otherwise

'would be sustaining a fraud that no court of conscience could
sanction.' ""
Finally, the last of the above subsections is consistent with Ken-

tucky Revised Statutes (KRS) section 304.14-090, which provides
in pertinent part:
(1) Any application for insurance in writing by the applicant
shall be altered solely by the applicant or by his written consent.
(3) An insurer issuing a policy upon an application which has
been unlawfully altered by its officer, employe, or agent shall not
11531 S.W.2d at 498. This doctrine will not be applied in the absence of a settlement
offer for the policy limits or less. See Cooper v. Automobile Club Ins. Co., 638 S.W.2d
280, 281 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981).
" See Wabash Life Ins. Co. v. Maguire, 461 S.W.2d 916, 920 (Ky. 1970) ("Viewing
this case in perspective, it seems remarkable to us that a reputable insurance carrier, with
as little justification as we can find in this record, would subject the beneficiary of its policies
to the burden of litigating her claim to a court of last resort.").
" See Deaton v. Allstate Ins. Co., 548 S.W.2d 162, 164-65 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977). But
see Feathers v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., No. 83-CA-158-MR (Ky. Ct. App. Aug.
5, 1983); noted in Harvey & Wiseman, First PartyBad Faith: Common Law Remedies and
a Proposed Legislative Solution, 72 Ky. L.J. 141 (1983-84) (although this case purports
to recognize first party bad faith, the opinion was issued after settlement of the case and
filing of a motion to dismiss the appeal); Hoskins v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 52 U.S.L.W.
2169 (Ohio Aug. 24, 1983) (recognizing first party bad faith).
36 617 S.W.2d 48 (Ky. Ct. App., 1980).
Id. at 50.
Id. at 51 (quoting Southern Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Montague, 2 S.W. 443 (Ky.
1887).
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have available in any action arising out of such policy, any
defense based upon the fact of such alteration, or as to any item

which was so altered.' 9
It would be misleading to suggest, on the basis of this hand-

ful of examples, that the proposed legislation might not clarify,
and in some cases greatly expand, the scope and extent of insurer's
liability under existing law. 2" Instead, I would suggest that the

perennial opposition to unfair claims practices legislation invariably
focuses on the expansion of the number of claimants with standing
to seek tort remedies against insurers, and the severity of express
or implied sanctions applied to single instances of "unfair" conduct, rather than on the practices of the insurer that are prohibited.
B.

PotentialSources of Resistance to the ProposedLegislation
1. First and "Fourth Party" Bad Faith

Section 1(3) of House Bill 360 would have made it an "unfair
claims settlement practice" for a "person" 2 ' to "willfully" commit any of the designated offenses which results in injury to first
or third party claimants. As mentioned above, Kentucky has been
reluctant to recognize a claim for first party "bad faith." ' 22 A good
"1 For a case applying this statute, see Anderson v. Zurich Ins. Co., 614 S.W.2d 246,
247 (Ky. 1980).
20 Cf. National Law Journal, Sept. 7, 1981, at 7, col. 2 (reporting a $3.25 million
jury award under the California Unfair Claims Practice Act, against an insurer who denied
the claims of two women "simply because they were blacks and were represented by a Jewish
lawyer").
21 At the risk of appearing partisan, I must recommend that the legislature consider
the myriad of problems and tactical abuses that will arise if insurance defense counsel are
deemed "persons" who may be sued along with their insurer clients for alleged "unfair
practices." See Kornblum, Royal Globe v. Superior Court: Its Impact on Litigation Involving Insurers, 29 DEF. L.J. 355, 371-72 (1980).
22 See note 15 supra and accompanying text. Deaton v. Allstate Ins. Co., 548 S.W.2d
at 162, treated the subject rather summarily, stating:
A first party claim gives rise to a contract action.
Manchester,however, deals with a third party claim against the insurer and
not with a first party claim against an insurer as in the present case .... [T]he
measure of recovery for failure to pay money due under the contract is the amount
agreed to be paid. Therefore, no recovery for punitive damages, as sought by
the appellants, can be had, nor consequential damages such as attorney fees,
witness fees, etc.
Id. at 164. But see Feathers v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., No. 83-CA-158-MR.
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statement of the differences between first and third party claims
for "bad faith" was advanced in Santilli v. State Farm Life
Insurance Co.,3 in which the court surveyed the available case law:
Plaintiff seeks to have this court recognize a cause of action
for tortious breach of an insurer's duty of "good faith and fair
dealing" when dealing with its insured. This is a distinct tort
which has recently emerged in California and has subsequently
found favor in some other jurisdictions....
This tort developed as an outgrowth of the cause of action
for an insurer's bad faith refusal to settle within the coverage
limits of a liability insurance policy.
However, although the two situations are somewhat similar,
there is a distinct difference between liability insurance and other
types of policies which should not be overlooked.
When an insured purchases liability insurance, he relinquishes
his right to control any litigation brought against him for conduct which is covered under the policy, and he loses his right to
negotiate a settlement with the opposing party. Moreover, when
the settlement value of a case approaches the policy limits, it
becomes increasingly more tempting for the insurer to gamble
on the results of litigation, for in refusing to settle under such
circumstances, the insurer stands to lose little and gain much. The
insured, however, has a strong interest in settlement so as to
avoid a judgment in excess of his coverage. Because of this conflict, courts have held insurers to a high duty of good faith and
fair dealing when conducting settlement negotiations on behalf
of their insured.
Such considerations are not applicable outside the field of
liability insurance. In cases involving the insurer's duty to pay
under policies for theft, fire, health, disability or life insurance,
the unique relationship which gives rise to the special duty of
liability insurers to attempt to settle within their policy limits does
not arise. The insured, or his beneficiary, is not subject to the
imposition of excess liability, and his rights and responsibilities
are limited to those set forth in his contract.2"
At the same time, the Santilli court noted a line of cases allowing claims for first party "bad faith":

23

24

562 P.2d 965 (Or. 1977).
Id. at 969 (citations omitted).
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On the other hand, it has been argued that the huge financial reserves of large insurance companies give them an advantageous bargaining position when dealing with injured
policyholders who are suddenly faced with the ruinous bills which
they purchased insurance to avoid. . . .Apparently, some insurance companies have taken advantage of this superior bargaining position and have sought to force their insureds to settle for
significantly less than they were entitled to through deliberate patterns of harassment and delay.2 5

The drafters of House Bill 360 apparently concluded that the
second line of cases was more persuasive. The bill not only
recognized a first party claimant's standing to complain of single
acts "willfully committed,"12 6 but also provided for awards of compensatory damages27 and attorney's fees.28 Moreover, the proposed
statute did not rule out punitive damages in "appropriate" cases.2 9
Most of the critics of House Bill 360 presumably would agree
that the "unfair practices" enumerated in the act not only needlessly delay the settlement of first party claims, but also work substantial hardship on first party claimants who may be forced to incur
crushing expenses to obtain the security they thought they
purchased in the first instance. However, the concerns of the insurance industry in resisting a major change in the prevailing law
are not devoid of merit when such changes carry with them the
potential for draconian and punitive jury verdicts.3 0
25 Id. at 969-70 & n.5 (citations omitted) (citing McDowell v. Union Mut. Life Ins.
Co., 404 F. Supp. 136, 141 (C.D. Cal. 1975); Silberg v. California Life Ins. Co., 521 P.2d
1103 (Cal. 1974); Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 510 P.2d 1032 (Cal. 1973); Richardson v.
Employers Liab. Assurance Corp., 102 Cal. Rptr. 547 (Ct. App. 1972); Fletcher v. Western
Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 89 Cal. Rptr. 78 (Ct. App. 1970); Annot., 47 A.L.R.3d 286 (1970).
Cf. A Litigator's War on Bad Faith, National Law Journal, Jan. 19, 1981, at 1, col.
4 (reporting a decision under the California Unfair Claims Practices Act in which it was
alleged that an insurer was denying claims under a health insurance policy to make up for
$4.5 million loss it had suffered).
26 H.R. 360, supra note 8, at §§ I(1)(a), (3).
2,H.R. 360 §§ l(5)(b), 5(b).
Id. at § 1(5)(b).
2,Id. Cf. Ford Motor Co. v. Mayes, 575 S.W.2d 480, 487 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978) (allowing plaintiff to collect punitive damages in Consumer Protection Act, Ky. Rav. STAT. §
367.220(1) (Bobbs-Merrill 1981) [hereinafter cited as KRS], suit, where breach of contract
also involves tortious conduct).
SO See, e.g., You're in Good Hands with.., the Right Jury, National Law Journal,
Sept. 20, 1982, at 43, col. 2 (reporting a $15,000 compensatory and $3.5 million punitive
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House Bill 360 also provided for direct claims or causes of
action against an insurer by third party tort claimants.' In the few
jurisdictions already permitting such claims to proceed, the direct
third party claim is referred to disparagingly as the "fourth party
bad faith claim," in part because it is viewed as incongruous to
allow a stranger to sue an insurer with whom he has not
contracted. 32

The drafters of House Bill 360 may not have contemplated
making any radical change in the common law of third party "bad
faith," as Kentucky law already approves the assignment of an insured's claim against the insurer for "bad faith" in full or partial
settlement of any excess judgment against the insured personally. 3
House Bill 360 stipulated that" no third party claimant shall bring

an action under this subsection until any action between the third
party claimant and the insured is concluded." ' 3 This provision
would have prohibited joinder of the insurer until the underlying
tort action was concluded. At first blush, it would appear that
House Bill 360 would have done no more than allow the successful

tort plaintiff to proceed directly against the insurer and recover any
excess judgment without taking a formal assignment." However,
by not limiting proposed third party claims to "excess" cases, 3"
damages award against an insurer who offered an unsatisfactory cash settlement for damages
to the insured's automobile). See also J. O'CoNNELL, TM LAwsUrr LoanRmy (1979):
The reasons punitive damages are often asked for although very rarely
enacted are illustrative of the manipulative, deceptive, subterranean world of tort
litigation. Plaintiffs' lawyers request them. . . .(1) to inflame the jury against
the defendant by the very terms of the accusation, regardless of whether the defendant's conduct in fact justifies the accusation; ...(3) to get evidence of the defendant's income and net worth before the jury, supposedly to help it decide how
big a verdict will "punish" him, but in fact to implant the idea of the defendant's wealth ...
Id. at 27-28.
3'H.R. 360, supra note 8, at § 1(5).
32 Cf. Allen, InsuranceBadFaithLaw: The Needfor Legislative Intervention, 13 PAc.
L.J. 833, 834-35 (1982) (noting that in a case of "third party bad faith" only the insured
or his assignee may sue the insurer).
11 See Grundy v. Manchester Ins. & Indem. Co., 425 S.W.2d 735, 737 (Ky. 1968).
31 H.R. 360, supra note 8, at § 1(5)(f).
11 Successful prosecution of a third party claim for the "excess" would presumably
moot the insured's claim for the "excess." Of course, some jurisdictions permit the insured to recover other consequential damages, such as damages for "mental suffering."
See Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 426 P.2d 173, 178-79 (Cal. 1967). If such a claim were not
assigned it could still be prosecuted by the insured.
36 See Good Times for 'BadFaith',National Law Journal, July 11, 1983, at 10, col. 2.
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the bill left the outer limits of third party "bad faith" uncertain,
and "subject to the convincing art of the trial lawyer." 3 7
2.

The Model Act and Bill 34-BR-237

The new bill that has been prefiled as Bill 84-BR-237 contains
the same list of "unfair claims settlement practices" contained in
the Model Act. The principal weaknesses of both are the absence
of any express remedies or enforcement mechanisms, and the
definition of substantive offenses solely in terms of conduct that
is "committed or performed with such frequency as to indicate a
general business practice. ' 38 It is expected that this watered-down
version of the act will survive opposition from the insurance industry and be passed by the General Assembly. However, before
adopting the proposed statute, the legislature should consider
whether private rights of action might be implied from its prohibitions, and whether judicial recognition of such private rights of
action would be desirable.
There is precedent for the recognition of implied private rights
of action under unfair claims settlement practices legislation. For
example, in Royal Globe Insurance Co. v. SuperiorCourt of Butte
County,3 9 the Supreme Court of California held that a third party
claimant in a personal injury case could pursue an implied private
right of action against the defendant's insurer for a violation of
the California Unfair Practices Act.40 The substantive violations
of the Act set forth in the complaint included reference to subsection (h)(5) of the California statute, which prohibits a "person"
from: "(h) Knowingly committing or performing with such frequency as to indicate a general businesspractice any of the following unfair claims settlement practices: . . (5) Not attempting in
good faith to effectuate prompt, fair, and equitable settlements of
claims in which liability has become reasonably clear."'4 In con.

37 Underwood, supra note 3, at 386 (citing Rumberger, Kisk & Wall, JusticeHolmes
and the Trial Lawyer: Malicious Prosecution, Bad Faith and... Excellence, 16 FORuM
627, 629 (1981)).
38 84-BR-237 § 1.
39 592 P.2d 329 (Cal. 1979).
40 Id.
at 332.
Id. at 331 n.1 (emphasis added) (quoting Ca. Ins. Code § 790.03(h) (West Supp.
1983).
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cluding that a private right of action could be implied from these
provisions, the California court apparently took into account the
weakness of the enforcement mechanism provided in the statute42-a
small fine for willful violation of any cease and desist order issued
by the Commissioner of Insurance. 3 Since the decision in Royal
Globe, the California courts have recognized implied private rights
of action in other insurance claims contexts," and have encouraged
the filing of such claims by allowing punitive damages to be awarded in cases involving "undue and oppressive disregard of [claimants' rights]."4

A court will be more likely to imply private rights of action
from unfair claims settlement practices legislation when the statute
under consideration provides for inadequate enforcement or
deterrence.46 Bill 84-BR-237 is certainly "toothless" in this regard.
In addition, Kentucky law favors the recognition of private rights
of action on behalf of persons injured by reason of violations of
state statutes. 7
However, if Bill 84-BR-237 is not amended, the introductory
sentence of Section 1 of the Act will present some difficulties of
construction for an implied right of action. Specifically, the proposed language appears to exclude single violations of the statute
which are "knowingly" or "willfully" committed, but which are
not committed "with such frequency as to indicate a general
business practice.'" 4 Accordingly, the proposed Kentucky statute
42

See Best, supra note 4, at 127.

Cal. Ins. Code § 790.07 (West Supp. 1983) (Fines range from $50 up to $500 for
willful violation of a cease and desist order. Otherwise, there are no sanctions for viola41

tion of the statutes).
" See, e.g., Chodos v. Insurance Co. of North Am., 178 Cal. Rptr. 831, 838 (Ct.
App. 1981) (automobile insurer breached implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
by falling to reasonably reimburse insured after agreeing to allow the insured to settle a
property damage claim).
" Delos v. Farmers Ins. Group, 155 Cal. Rptr. 843, 857 (Ct. App. 1979).
41 Cf. Cosmopolitan Mut. Ins. Co. v. Nassau Ins. Co., 417 N.Y.S.2d
835, 836 (1979);
Cohen v. New York Property Ins. Underwriting Ass'n, 410 N.Y.S.2d 597, 602 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1978) (statute performing the deterrent function of punitive damages obviates the

necessity for suing for punitive damages).
47 KRS § 446.070 (1975) provides: "A person injured by the violation of any statute
may recover from the offender such damages as he sustained by reason of the violation,
although a penalty or forfeiture is imposed for such violation."
' H.R. 360, supra note 8, at § 1(3). Compare this with the text of the California statute
in the text accompanying note 41 supra. See also Review of Selected 1975 CaliforniaLegislation, 7 PAc. L.J. 237, 484 (1976).
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may not admit to the same construction given the California statute
in Royal Globe. Rather than simply "pass the buck" to the courts,
the legislature should address the issue of private remedies directly.
3. A Proposal
If it is agreed that the "unfair practices" enumerated in Bill
84-BR-237 needlessly delay the settlement of insurance claims and
work a substantial hardship on a significant number of
policyholders and third party claimants in the Commonwealth,
there is little justification for the absence of express remedies in
the proposed legislation. If agency action to police unfair practices
cannot be funded, or is deemed an insufficient deterrent, then
private rights of action should be recognized expressly. That is not
to say that an amended statute must be drafted in such a way as
to allow for disproportionate awards of compensatory and punitive
damages. The legislature might, for example, adopt the proposed
bill with amendments that permit awards of attorney's fees, 9 interest penalties, or both, for the successful prosecution of first party
claims. Third party actions for "excess liability" for "bad faith"
could then be prosecuted in accordance with existing case law.
Adoption of such an amended bill might eliminate the need for
judicial expansion of the tort of "bad faith" and provide a deterrent sufficient to obviate the need for new administrative
machinery.
II.

A.

TI

CONTRACTUAL COMMITMENT

Coverage and Exclusions

In an effort to protect themselves from "fraudulent applicants
seeking coverage for known diseases," 5 many health and
hospitalization insurers include a provision in their policies "excluding or postponing coverage of an illness originating prior to
the issuance of the policy or within a stated time during which the
policy is effective."'" In Inter-OceanInsurance Co. v. Engler," the
court of appeals was faced with the task of interpreting such a pro" Similar legislation is surveyed in Best, supra note 4, at 133-34.
" Mutual Hosp. Ins., Inc. v. Klapper, 288 N.E.2d 279, 282 (Ind. Ct. App. 1972).
Annot., 94 A.L.R.3d 990, 995 (1979).
632 S.W.2d 459 (Ky. Ct. App. 1982).
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vision in a cancer insurance policy. The provision denied coverage
for treatment if the disease "first manifested itself" within ninety
days after the policy's effective date."
In Engler, the insured had procured a cancer policy effective
July 6, 1979. During the same month the insured was being treated
by his family doctor for pneumonia. Chest x-rays were taken, and
by September 27, 1979 (within the ninety-day exclusion period) that
doctor had noted a lesion on the insured's lung and had referred
the insured to a thoracic surgeon. However, the lesion was not
diagnosed by microscopic examination to be cancer until an operation as performed on October 6. At issue in the case was whether
the disease had "first manifested itself" prior to the expiration of
the ninety day exclusion period, or whether a definite diagnosis had
to have been made or communicated to the insured within the exclusion period to defeat the claim."4
After noting that the highest court of Kentucky had not yet
interpreted the phrase "first manifests itself," the court of appeals
adopted a test that is growing in popularity"5 in other jurisdictions:
[I]n order for an insurer to defeat an insured's claim for
health insurance benefits on the ground that the insured's covered
disease first manifested itself within a specified exclusion period,
the insurer has the burden of proving that sufficient symptoms
of the disease are present within the specified period that a physi56
cian would be led to diagnose the disease.

Under this standard, the insured receives some consideration, inasmuch as latent but unascertainable conditions will not fall within
the exclusion. On the other hand, the exclusion may be applied in
some cases in which the exact nature of the disease is not diagnosed
within the exclusion period (the disease need only have been
"diagnosable") 57 , and the insured may have had no knowledge of
the presence of the disease until after the expiration of that period.

, Id. at 459.
s Id. at 463.
" Id. at 461. The test adopted has been described as the "majority" view. Mutual
Hosp. Ins., Inc. v. Klapper, 288 N.E.2d at 282.
11632 S.W.2d at 461 (quoting McDaniel v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 591 P.2d 1094
(Kan. Ct. App. 1979)).
" See McDaniel v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 591 P.2d at 1096-98.
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A summary judgment in favor of the insured's estate was
granted by the trial judge in Engler, although neither of the insured's physicians had been asked whether the insured had sufficient symptoms of cancer during the ninety day period to lead them
to a diagnosis of cancer, and in spite of the defendant's consulting
physician's testimony that the x-ray showing a lesion was sufficient
to make such a diagnosis "until proven otherwise." 58 Under these
circumstances, the court of appeals held that there was a genuine
issue of material fact as to whether the cancer had "first manifested
itself" within ninety days of the issuance of the policy, and summary judgment for the plaintiff was reversed."'
In another effort to limit their exposure, accident insurers attempt to avoid paying claims for losses resulting "principally or60
in any considerable measure from bodily infirmity or disease."
The typical policy attempts to do this by defining coverage in terms
of any loss "resulting directly, independently and exclusively of61
all other causes from bodily injuries effected solely by accident."
Cases construing such policy language are legion and often impossible to reconcile.
The court of appeals interpreted this type of clause in the context of a policy providing for the payment of benefits for temporary
or permanent disability in ColonialLife & Accident Insurance Co.
v. Weartz.62 Weartz, the insured, slipped while carrying a bathtub
at his workplace and suffered a back injury. 63 After surgery failed
to alleviate the condition, his physicians certified to Colonial that
the insured had been totally disabled as a direct result of the accident, independently of all other causes. 6" However, after paying
benefits for some time, Colonial terminated Weartz's benefits and
litigation followed. 65 At trial Colonial relied upon certain testimony
given by Weartz's orthopedist that his disability was fifty percent
due to a pre-existing back condition. However, the evidence also
, 632 S.W.2d at 463.
, Id. at 463.
o See W. VANCE, INSURANCE 976 (3d ed. 1951).
6, Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Weartz, 636 S.W.2d 891, 892 (Ky. Ct. App.
1982). Several variations of this clause are discussed in VANCE, supra note 60, at 976-78.
62 636 S.W.2d at 891.
Id. at 892.
64 Id.

65Id.
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showed that the insured had not complained of any back problems
prior to his accident and that this pre-existing condition might never
have caused any problems.16 Moreover, the orthopedist also
testified that the "pre-existing and dormant non-disabling condition.., was a pre-disposing factor... [but] [t]he injury was the
cause [of his disability]." 67 In addition, the orthopedist had
originally referred to his fifty percent allocation in the context of
a proceeding seeking worker's compensation benefits. 6 The jury
returned a verdict for Weartz.
On appeal, Colonial contended that the orthopedist's testimony
established, as a matter of law, that Weartz's disability did not
result "independently and exclusively of all other causes" from his
accident.69 The court of appeals affirmed the jury's verdict and rejected the insurer's contention, relying upon ContinentalCasualty
Co. v. Freeman,70 a decision by the former Court of Appeals which
surveyed the varying constructions given to similar exclusions in
accident and disability policies. 7' After noting the "divergence of
viewpoints" regarding the application of such exclusions, the Court
in Freeman stated that the problem in any case "is to define the
degree of importance the contributing causal factor must have had
in order to negate the accidental injury's having been the 'sole,'
'exclusive' or 'independent' cause of the disability." '7 The Court
admitted that in its statement of the problem it was departing from
a literal construction of the word "independently. ' 73 However,
such a departure is consistent with the consumer's reasonable expectations, and allowed the Court to formulate a workable test of
causation:
[A] pre-existing infirmity or disease is not to be considered as
a cause unless it substantially contributed to the disability or loss.
...[A] "pre-disposition" or "susceptibility" to injury, whether
it results from congenital weakness or from previous illness or

67

Id. at 893.
Id. at 894.

68

Id.

69

Id. at 893.

66

7o481 S.W.2d 309 (Ky. 1972).
"
Id. at 314-15.
72 Id. at 313.
73 Id.
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injury, does not necessarily amount to a substantial contributing
cause. A7 4 mere "relationship" of undetermined degree is not
enough.

When the court of appeals applied this standard to the facts in
Weartz, it had little difficulty concluding that "reasonable minds
could [have] differ[ed] as to whether Weartz's pre-existing back
condition substantially contributed to his disability,"" meaning the
question was one for the jury. The court also noted the possible
inaccuracy of opinions regarding percentages of causation in the
context of worker's compensation proceedings:
In many instances these opinions are nothing more than
educated guesses. Therefore, we decline to find that when they
are expressed in a proceeding outside the context of workers'
compensation such as the case at bar, they are conclusive
evidence as to the extent to which a preexisting disease or condition has contributed to a person's physical disability. Medical
evidence other than a doctor's opinion formulated solely for
worker's compensation purposes is necessary to conclusively
establish that a preexisting condition or disease has substantially contributed
to and hence is a legal cause of a person's total
7
disability. '
The difficulty of interpreting and applying policy language to
the facts of a particular case was also illustrated in the recent case
of Fosterv. Allstate Insurance Co., 7 which involved the liability
coverage of a homeowner's insurance policy in the context of an
insured's activities as a babysitter. In Foster, the insureds, husband
and wife, obtained a homeowner's policy insuring their new home.
In applying for the policy they truthfully stated that there was no
business or professional activity on the insured premises. Sometime
later, however, the insured wife began babysitting the infant son
of a Mr. and Mrs. Trujillo for $35 per week. Tragically, the infant Trujillo was fatally injured in a fall on the premises, and a
negligence action was brought against the insured wife. 7 The in, Id. at 314.
636 S.W.2d

"

76

at

894.

Id.

77 637 S.W.2d 655 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981).
71 Id. at 656.
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surer sought and obtained a declaratory judgment that the liability protection of the policy did not apply "to bodily injury or property damage arising out of business pursuits of any Insured except
activities therein which are ordinarily incident to non-business
79
pursuits."
The trial judge found the above exclusion to prevent recovery
on the policy. 0 The court of appeals assumed that babysitting was
a "business pursuit," and then considered two "reasonable" constructions of the statute:
[1] that an accident which occurs in the carrying on of a
business pursuit is excluded from coverage unless that accident
occurs while the insured, although engaged in carrying on a
business pursuit, is also engaged in activities which are ordinarily
incident to nonbusiness pursuits [i.e., child care], 8 ' or
[2] that an accident which occurs in the carrying on of a
business pursuit is excluded from coverage unless the accident
occurs while the insured is engaged in an activity
which is not
2
ordinarily incident to the business pursuit.
Having concluded that both constructions were reasonable, the
court applied the doctrine of contra proferentem, 3 and adopted
the construction most favorable to the insured.8"
B.

Cancellation By Substitution

"According to the majority rule, the mere procuring of
substitute insurance with an intent to replace an existing permaI/d.
80

Id. at 657.

Id. at 657 (citing Crane v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 485 P.2d 1129 (Cal.
1971)). Obviously, this was the construction advanced by the insured.
82 637 S.W.2d at 657 (citing Stanley v. American Fires & Casualty Co., 361 So. 2d
1030 (Ala. 1978)).
83 This refers to the principle that a contract will be construed against the one who
wrote it. See BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 296 (5th ed. 1979).
84 637 S.W.2d at 657. Other cases involving "coverage" issues, which were decided
during the Survey period but are not discussed at length in this Survey include Breeding
v. Massachusetts Indem. & Life Ins. Co., 633 S.W.2d 717 (Ky. 1982) (insurer's failures
to comply with KRS § 304.18-080(2) estopped insurer from relying on an exclusion); California Union Ins. Co. v. Spade, 642 S.W.2d 582 (Ky. 1982) (construing the coverage and noncoverage provisions of a contractor's equipment policy); American Interinsurance Exch.
v. Norton, 631 S.W.2d 851 (Ky. Ct. App. 1982) (transfer of possession of motor vehicle
pursuant to an agreement of sale denied transferee status of an insured).
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nent policy, but without an intent to acquire additional insurance,
does not cancel the existing policy." 5 The Kentucky Court of
Appeals recently adopted this position in The TravelersInsurance
Co. v. Motorists Mutual Insurance Co.8 6 In Travelers, the insured
owned a service station, and insured it with Motorists Mutual for
$35,000.87 The policy had an expiration date of October 28, 1980.
On October 16, 1980, the insured sold the property to one Napier
under a land contract which required Napier to insure the property
for not less than $65,000, payable to the sellers.8 8 Napier obtained
a policy from Travelers on October 22, 1980.89
When the property was destroyed by fire on October 27, 1980,
after Travelers had become bound, but before the Motorists policy
had expired, a dispute arose as to which policy covered the loss.
Travelers demanded that the loss be pro-rated between the insurers,
but Motorists sought to apply the doctrine of cancellation by
substitution.9"
The evidence demonstrated that the sellers, Motorists' insureds,
did not intend to continue the Motorists policy after its expiration
date and had intended that Travelers provide the only coverage?'
However, the record contained no evidence of an intent to cancel
the Motorists policy prior to its expiration date.92 Distinguishing
Potomac Insurance Co. v. Motorists Mutual Insurance Co., 9
which involved the cancellation by substitution of a binder,9" and
noting that the Motorists policy contained no provision that procurement of other coverage would effect cancellation of the policy,
the court of appeals ruled that liability for the loss should be prorated between the two companies.95
" Underwood, supra note 1, at 260.
86 649 S.W.2d 414 (Ky. Ct. App. 1982), discretionaryrev, denied, 30 Ky. L. Summ.
4, at 15 (Ky. Mar. 23, 1983) [hereinafter cited as KLS].
87

Id.

" Id.

89Id.
,0 Id. at 415.

Id. at 414.
92

Id.

11598 S.W.2d 461 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979), discretionaryrev. denied, 27 KLS 7, at 12
(Ky. May 29, 1980). For a discussion of this case, see Underwood, supra note 1, at 260-61.
1, A binder is "a temporary contract of insurance providing immediate coverage until
a permanent policy can be obtained." Underwood, supra note 1, at 260.
11649 S.W.2d at 415.
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MOTOR VEHICLE REPARATIONS ACT

Cases decided during the Survey period relating to the interpretation and construction of the Motor Vehicle Reparations Act
(MVRA)96 will be analyzed by organizing them according to subject matter.
A.

Application- Who Is Entitled To Basic ReparationBenefits
1. Persons Injured While Privately Engaged In
Normal Vehicular Repair Work

Under the MVRA, basic reparation benefits (BRB) are defined
as "benefits providing reimbursement for net loss suffered through
injury arising out of the operation, maintenance or use of a motor
vehicle." 97 Furthermore, KRS section 304.39-030(1) provides "[i]f
the accident causing injury occurs in this Commonwealth every person suffering loss from injury arising out of maintenance or use
of a motor vehicle has a right to basic reparation benefits." 9'
In the recent case of Commercial Union Assurance Companies
v. Howard,99 the question before the Kentucky Supreme Court was
whether "a standard insurance policy issued pursuant to the requirements of the Kentucky [MVRA] afford[s] coverage to an injured policyholder who is injured while attempting to repair his
00
own vehicle while parked in his own driveway."'
At first blush, it would seem that an injury suffered during a
repair operation should be viewed as "arising out of maintenance
... of a motor vehicle."''1 At least one court has suggested that
the matter is that simple. 0 ,However, "maintenance" is not defined
in the Kentucky MVRA,103 and its everyday meaning is sufficiently
KRS §§ 304.39-010 to -340 (1981 & Cum. Supp. 1982).
KRS § 304.39-020(2) (Cum.Supp. 1982).
9$ KRS § 304.39-030(1) (Cum.Supp. 1982).
637 S.W.2d 647 (Ky. 1982).
,00Id. at 648.
,01KRS § 304.39-030(1) (1981).
02 See Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Pridgen, 339 So. 2d 1164 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976)
(plaintiff was found to be engaged in the "maintenance" of his jeep when his hand was
sandwiched between a trailer and the backup light of his jeep while he was attempting to
disconnect a wire).
103But cf.KRS § 304.39-020(16) (Cum.Supp. 1982) (defines "maintaining a motor
vehicle").
90
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flexible to encompass activities for which the cost of automobile
insurance might not be expected to be allocated. In Commercial
Union the Kentucky Supreme Court concluded that, in the absence
of any clear statement by the legislature to the contrary, automobile
insurance coverage should not be extended to cover accidents that
do not relate to the "driving" of a vehicle. The Court stated: "Mr.
Howard was not utilizing his truck as a vehicle at the time he
received his injuries. It would seem that other relevant types of insurance coverage [such as health insurance and home owner's insurance] could have been available to him under the
circumstances." 0 4 This narrow construction of the statute may
make sense as a matter of policy. But, the Court's analysis of the
language of the statute was somewhat circuitous. Specifically, instead of giving the word "maintenance" a special meaning,' and
rather than conceding that KRS section 304.39-020(6)(i) suggests
that vehicular repair "off... business premises" could be a "use
of a motor vehicle,"' 0 6 the Court began its analysis with the definition of "maintaining a motor vehicle," found in KRS section
304.39-020(16): " 'Maintaining a motor vehicle' means having legal
custody, possession or responsibility for a motor vehicle by one
other than an owner or operator."'0 7
After observing that this definition "clearly does not include"
repair or service of a motor vehicle, 0 8 the Court opined that the
real question was whether the legislature intended the word
"maintenance" to have a different definition in different parts of
the statute.0 9 Unfortunately, the Court did not, and perhaps could
not, provide an answer to this question, after suggesting that it was
the linchpin of its analysis.

"I

,04637 S.W.2d at 649 (emphasis in original).
Cf. Green v. Moore, 135 S.W.2d 682, 683 (Ky. 1939) ("Unless there is something

in the act plainly indicating a contrary sense in which the language was employed, the usual
and ordinary meaning of the words will be attributed to them."); KRS § 446.080(4) (1975).
"06Cf. Note, Kentucky No-Fault: An Analysis and Interpretation,65 Ky. L.J. 465,
483 (1976-77) ("[i]f the driver of a tow truck is injured on the highway while servicing or
repairing an automobile ... [he is] within the definition of use of a motor vehicle 'as a

vehicle' "). Perhaps "off premises" repair by a mechanic on the roadside would be viewed
as relating more directly to "driving" the vehicle than a home repair. In addition, other
insurance might not be available to compensate the injured victim in the roadside situation.
10, 637 S.W.2d at 648.
50I Id.
at 649 (emphasis in original).
109 Id.
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Non-Residents Entitled to BRB

KRS section 304.39-030(1) provides that "every person suffering loss from injury arising out of maintenance or use of a motor
vehicle has a right to basic reparation benefits, unless he has rejected the limitation upon his tort rights as provided in KRS sec-

tion 304.39-060(4)." However, the latter section suggests that a
non-resident from a state without no-fault insurance who has
liability coverage' 0 will be deemed to have rejected no-fault and
will not be entitled to BRB."'

On the other hand, KRS section 304.39-100(2) provides:
An insurer authorized to transact or transacting business in this
Commonwealth shall file with the commissioner of Insurance as
a condition of its continued transaction of business within this
Commonwealth a form ...declaring that in any contractof liability insurancefor injury, wherever issued, covering the... use
of a motor vehicle ...while the vehicle is in this Commonwealth

shall be deemed to provide the basic reparationbenefits coverage.
112

If a non-resident insurer complies with this statute, then it is clear
that the non-resident insured will be entitled to draw BRB from
his or her insurer,if injured in his or her insured vehicle while that
vehicle is in the Commonwealth, absent proof of a rejection of
no-fault." 3 However, may a non-resident insured subject his or her
insurerto BRB obligations arising out of an accident in Kentucky
that did not involve the insured vehicle? The Kentucky Court of
I The liability coverage must be consistent with the requirements of KRS § 304.39-110
(1981), which states the required minimum tort liability insurance. See KRS § 304.39-060(4)
(Cum. Supp. 1982).
-1 KRS § 304.39-060(4) states in pertinent part:
[A]ny person who, at the time of an accident, does not have basic reparation
insurance but has not formally rejected such limitations of his tort rights and
liabilities and has at such time in effect security equivalent to that required by
KRS 304.39-110 shall be deemed to have fully rejected such limitations within
[the] meaning of this section for that accident only.
See also Note, supra note 106, at 487-88.
112 KRS § 304.39-100(2) (1981) (emphasis added).
"' Cf. Stinnett v. Mulquin, 579 S.W.2d 374, 376 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978) (an opportunity
to reject statutory limitations on tort right to sue must be afforded before a non-resident
injured party can be limited to BRB recovery), discretionaryrev. denied, 26 KLS 6, at 16
(Ky. Apr. 24, 1979).
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Appeals answered this question in the affirmative in DairylandIn4
surance Co. v. Assigned Claims Plan."1
In that case O'Neal, a resident of Tennessee, was a passenger in an uninsured automobile
owned and driven by another Tennessee resident when it was involved in an accident in Simpson County, Kentucky." 5 Dairyland,
O'Neal's Tennessee insurer, paid BRB to O'Neal under his Tennessee policy until it decided that its BRB obligation should only
extend to claims arising from the maintenance or use of O'Neal's
vehicle in Kentucky. When Dairyland ceased paying BRB, O'Neal
secured additional benefits from the Assigned Claims Plan through
Home Insurance Company." 6 Home and the Assigned Claims Plan
then sought reimbursement from Dairyland." 7 Dairyland appealed from a circuit court decision affirming arbitration proceedings
which had held that Dairyland was obligated to make such
reimbursements." 8I The Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed the
circuit court, rejecting Dairyland's argument that the Tennessee
policy should be converted into a basic reparation policy only while
the insured vehicle was being operated in the Commonwealth. ' 9
Specifically, the court concluded that the BRB coverage provided
in KRS section 304.93-100(2) follows either the named insured or
the insured vehicle, so that BRB is available from the insured nonresident's insurer "for injuries arising out of the maintenance or
use of any motor vehicle in this jurisdiction."' 20 The court stated
that its construction of KRS section 304.39-100(2) was necessary
to prevent "discrimination between residents and non-residents"
and to insure that the "remedial quality of the statute" would not
be thwarted.' 2 ' However, this seems a bit of an overstatement since
the issue was not whether BRB would be paid, but who would pay
it.
The construction given the statute in Dairylandseems questionable from a grammatical point of view, and is inconsistent with
"130 KLS 5, at I (Ky. Ct. App. Apr. 21, 1983), discretionaryrev. granted, 30 KLS
11, at 24 (Ky. Sept. 14, 1983).
116

Id.
Id.

17

Id.

[is

II Id.
120

Id. at 2.
Id. at I (emphasis added).
Id. at 2.
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the commentary to the Uniform Motor Vehicle Accident Repara-

tions Act (UMVARA),' 22 section 9 of which provided the model
' The comfrom which KRS section 304.39-100(2) was tailored. 23
mentary clearly indicates that section 9 applies to an insurer if "the
only contact of the insurer with this state is that its insured permitted operation of the insured vehicle in this State.""'2 The commentary further states: "[Olperation of the insured vehicle within
the State, standing alone, should be a sufficient contact allowing
the State to impose its substantive laws upon the out-of-State in'2
surer of an out-of-State vehicle."' 1
The purpose of subsection (c) of UMVARA section 9, according to the commentary, is "to preclude insurers from including

provisions in their out-of-State liability contracts which might
mislead insureds to suppose they were not protected under their
policies for basic reparation benefits when their vehicles were
operated in this State."'' 26 Thus, the repeated emphasis of the UM-

VARA commentary is, contrary to the ruling of the court of appeals in Dairyland,that the equivalent to KRS section 304.39-100(2)

only applies when a non-resident insured's vehicle is operated in
the state, either by the insured or with the permission of the
insured. '2
22

Uniform Motor Vehicle Accident Reparations Act § 9, 14 U.L.A. 74-76 (1972)

[hereinafter cited as UMVARA].
,23UMVARA § 9 provides:
(b) Notwithstanding any contrary provision in it, every contract of liability
insurance for injury, wherever issued, covering ownership, maintenance, or use
of a motor vehicle, except a contract which provides coverage only for liability
in excess of required minimum tort liability coverages (section 10), includes basic
reparation benefit coverages and minimum security for tort liabilities required
by this Act, while it is in this State, and qualifies as security covering the vehicle.
(c) An insurer authorized to transact or transacting business in this State
may not exclude, in any contract of liability insurance for injury, wherever issued,
covering ownership, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle, except a contract
providing coverage only for liability in excess of required minimum tort liability coverage (section 10), the basic reparation benefit coverages and required
minimum security for tort liabilities required by this Act, while the vehicle is in
this State.
(emphasis added).
32
UMVARA § 9(b) comment (emphasis added).
325 Id.
(emphasis added).
326 UMVARA § 9(c) comment (emphasis added).
327 See UMVARA § 9(b) comment.
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The prefatory note to the UMVARA provides additional commentary consistent with the arguments advanced by Dairyland,and
inconsistent with the court of appeals construction of the Kentucky
statute. This note states:
The Act applies to any motor vehicle accident occurring
within the State without regard to where any involved vehicle is
registered or how long it has been in the State. It converts any
motor vehicle liability insurance policy, including one issued
elsewhere, into a basic reparation policy while the insured vehicle is operatedin the State. Also the benefits provided by a policy
of basic reparation insurance are applicable to injuries or losses
occurring outside of the State to the insured and members of his
family and to any occupant of the insured vehicle. 28
B.

Coordination of Benefits
1.

Calculation of Net Loss

One of the criticisms of the fault system of compensation is
that its benefits are not coordinated with benefits paid from other
sources. 12 9 In order to "coordinate benefits" available to an accident victim, the typical no-fault statute modifies the familiar "collateral source rule," and provides benefits for "net loss." For example, the UMVARA provides in pertinent part:
"Net loss" means loss less benefits or advantages, from sources
other than basic and added reparation insurance, required to be
subtracted from loss in calculating net loss.
All benefits or advantages a person receives or is entitled to
receive because of the injury from social security, workmen's
compensation, and any state-required temporary, nonoccupational disability insurance are subtracted in calculating net loss.' 3
Until recently, the Kentucky MYRA contained a similar provision in KRS section 304.39-120(1) (Calculation of net loss): "All
2I
229

UMVARA commissioners' prefatory note, 14 U.L.A. at 45 (emphasis added).
See generally J. HENDERSON & R. PEARSON, THE TORTS PROCESS 699-705 (1975)

(citing STATE OF NEW YORK INSURANCE DEPARTMENT,
F..
FOR WHOSE BENEFIT 18-38, 40-43 (1970)).

-I- UMVARA §§ l(a)(8), 11(a).
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benefits or advantages a person receives or is entitled to receive
because of the injury from social security and workers' compensation are subtracted in calculating net loss."' However, since the
last Survey was published, the Kentucky legislature has amended
this subsection of the statute to delete social security benefits from
the calculation of net loss.' 32
2. Survivor's Benefits
The MVRA provides a decedent's survivors 133 with benefits for
any compensation (survivor's economic loss)"' or services (survivor's replacement services loss)"' the decedent would have provided had he or she not died. The MVRA does not provide an
automatic accidental death benefit payable to survivors, because
the particular survivor must have suffered an actual and compensable loss. 36 In the recent case of Hoisclaw v. Kenilworth Insurance
Company,'37 the Kentucky Court of Appeals considered whether
decedent's father, as sole shareholder of her corporate employer,
could recover survivor's benefits calculated on the basis of the loss
of her services to the corporation. 38 Although there was no
evidence that the decedent made direct contributions to the home
or the needs of her family, although she did live with her parents,
it was contended that she worked for her father's corporation for
less than the true value of her services. As a result of her death,
some of the services she performed had to be replaced at a higher
cost. 39 The court of appeals agreed that decedent's father was a
"'

KRS § 304.39-120(1) (1981).

132

See KRS § 304.39-120 (Cum. Supp. 1982).

A "survivor" is "one entitled to receive benefits by reason of the death of another
person." KRS § 304.39-020(14) (Cum.Supp. 1982).
"14 " 'Survivor's economic loss' means loss after decedent's death of contributions
of
things of economic value to his survivors, not including services they would have received
from the decedent if he had not suffered the fatal injury, less expenses of the survivors
avoided by reason of decedent's death." KRS § 304.39-020(5)(d) (Cum. Supp. 1982).
3I " 'Replacement service loss' means expenses reasonably incurred in obtaining or"3

dinary and necessary services in lieu of those the injured person would have performed,
not for income but for the benefit of himself or his family, if he had not been injured."
KRS § 304.39-020(5)(c) (Cum. Supp. 1982).
"I See Aetna Ins. Co. v. Thompson, 27 KLS 9, at 10 (Ky. Ct. App. July 11, 1980),
affrd, 614 S.W.2d 537 (Ky. 1981).
"3
644 S.W.2d 353 (Ky. Ct. App. 1982).
' Holsclaw v. Kenilworth Ins. Co., 644 S.W.2d at 355.
I' at 354.
Id.
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survivor, but also agreed with the court below that the loss in question was a loss to the corporation, and not to the survivor directly, thus preventing recovery."'
3. Interest and Attorney's Fees
Several provisions of the MVRA encourage the insurer to make
prompt payment of BRB. Specifically, "[b]enefits payments are
overdue if not paid within thirty (30) days after the reparation
obligor receives reasonable proof of the fact and amount of the
loss realized."' 4 ' Overdue payments bear interest at twelve percent
per annum, and if the obligor's delay was without reasonable foundation, the rate of interest is increased to eighteen percent per
annum. 142 In addition to these penalties, a court may award the
claimant a reasonable attorney's fee if overdue benefits are
recovered after a denial or delay without reasonable foundation." 3
An award of both an eighteen percent penalty and attorney's
fees to the reparation obligee was approved in Kentucky Farm
Bureau Mutual Insurance Company v. Roberts.'4 Subsequently,
the trial court imposed an additional attorney's fee to cover the
representation of the reparation obligee on appeal. The reparation
obligor then argued that this additional award improperly penalized
the exercise of its first appeal as of right, in violation of Section
115 of the Constitution of Kentucky." 5 The Supreme Court rejected
this contention:
KRS 304.39-220 provides for a penalty of reasonable attorneys
fees "on a claim or in an action for basic or added reparation
benefits... if the denial or delay was without reasonable foundation." The only issue of that appeal was the reasonableness
of the delay. Until that issue is fully resolved either through the
appellate process or through failure to perfect an appeal, the appellee has no basis upon which to enforce her judgment. Had
the Court of Appeals determined that the delay was not
1,0

Id. at 355.

KRS § 304.39-210(1) (1981).
KRS § 304.39-210(2) (1981).
1.3 KRS § 304.39-220 (1981).
"' 603 S.W.2d 498 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980). For a discussion of this case see Underwood,
supra note 1, at 278.
"I See Moore v. Roberts, 29 KLS 15, at 8 (Ky. Dec. 14, 1982).
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unreasonable, then the appellee would not have been able to collect any additional attorney's fees.
The award of the additional fee is not, as suggested by Farm
Bureau, a penalty imposed upon its right to appeal, but rather
an item of monetary damages allowed by the legislature due to
the continuing representation upon the issue of reasonableness.
An appeal is always at one's own peril. Clearly KRS 304.39-220
envisages that the fee shall attach to the logical and legal conclusion of litigation.
Therefore, since a portion of this appeal relates to that same
issue, the trial court may permit additional attorney's fees for
this appeal ....116
4.

Subrogation

In ProgressiveCasualty Insurance Company v. Kidd147 the Kentucky Supreme Court ruled:
[I]f a reparation obligor fails to assert its claim for subrogation
by joining as a party in an action commenced by the injured partyor fails to seek reimbursement pursuant to KRS § 304.39-030
sixty days after the claim has been presented to the reparation
obligor of the secured person, then it may not otherwise recover
its BRB payments by way of equitable subrogation or any judicial
policy against double recovery.148
In Kidd, the reparation obligor failed to intervene or otherwise prosecute its claim for subrogation. As a result, the injured party was
awarded a double recovery. The Supreme Court "reluctantly" held
that the injured party could keep the recovery,1 49 though the Court
expressed the hope that such windfall awards would not be allowed
infuture cases. 5 '
The recent case of Dudas v. Kaczmarek5 ' suggests how double recoveries may be avoided in cases in which the insurer fails
to intervene or otherwise assert its subrogation rights. In Dudas,
Kaczmarek sued Dudas for compensation for injuries sustained in
146

Id.

at 9.

1-1602 S.W.2d 416 (Ky. 1980).
"I Underwood, supra note 1, at 278.
14,

602 S.W.2d at 417.

Id. at 418.
,,1652 S.W.2d 868 (Ky. Ct. App. 1983).
ISo
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a collision between Dudas' automobile, in which Kaczmarek was
a passenger, and another vehicle.' 5 2 The driver and owner of the
other vehicle were dismissed from the case, and the jury returned
a verdict against Dudas and in favor of Kaczmarek for medical
and hospital expenses ($7,894.84), lost wages ($12,806.24), and pain
and suffering ($5,000), for a total award of $25,701.08.153 The trial
judge awarded the total amount of the judgment, allowing no setoff for $8,008.85 of BRB already paid to Kaczmarek by his insurer
5
for medical expenses and lost wages.'
The court of appeals held that the defendant properly objected
to such a double recovery and substantiated the objection by the
filing of an agreed statement establishing the BRB already paid to
the plaintiff.'5 The court rejected the contention that the
nonrecoverability of BRB had to be pled as an affirmative defense,
on the theory that KRS section 304.39-060(2)(a) expressly abolished
tort liability "to the extent the basic reparation benefits provided
' 56
•. . [in the statute] are payable therefor."'
The Dudas court next considered whether the jury's award
should have been reduced by the amount of BRB paid ($8,008.85)
or the maximum amount of BRB payable ($10,000). Because the
jury awarded damages for medical expenses and lost wages in
excess of $10,000, and because up to $10,000 for such items were
recoverable as BRB, the court held that the verdict should have
been reduced by $10,000, the maximum amount of tort liability
established by the Act and "payable" as BRB.' 57 The court reasoned that just because
an individual does not elect to pursue basic reparation benefits
to the maximum payable under the Motor Vehicle Reparations
Act does not somehow give him an opportunity to obtain the difference between what he has received and the maximum payable
in any recovery that he may secure by legal action against a tortfeasor, because by the statute, there is no tort liability on the tortfeasor for the $10,000 of damages on those elements included
"I Id. at 869.
"'
'"

Id.
Id.
Id.
I5

116 Id.

at 870 (emphasis in original).

" Id. at 871.

KENTUCKY LAW

Jou[NAL

[Vol. 72

in basic reparation benefits. If the appropriate reparation obligor,
see KRS 304.39-050, is not forthcoming in paying basic reparation benefits to the statutory maximum, the injured party has a
remedy under the Act to collect them. See KRS 304.39-210, -220,
-160. Admittedly, in Hargett v. Dodson, supra, this Court
allowed a plaintiff to recover from a defendant an amount for
damages within the maximum payable for basic reparation
benefits after reduction by the amount of basic reparation
benefits paid. However, in that case, unlike this one, the repara- tion obligor of the plaintiff was also the obligor of the defendant, and the Court sanctioned that approach to avoid 'a circuitous exercise.' 597 S.W.2d at 153. That technique has no application here.' 58
In Fireman'sFund Insurance Company v. Bennett,'59 decided
in the prior Survey period, the court of appeals held that an insurance carrier which has paid BRB has no right to recover its
payments from the tortfeasor in an action for indemnity, independent of its right of subrogation under KRS section 304.39-070.06o
In other words, the statutory method of subrogation provided for
in the MVRA is exclusive."' Because an apparent inconsistency between that opinion and an opinion by another panel of the same
court in United States Fidelity and Guaranty Company v. Gayle,6 2
was perceived, the Supreme Court accepted both cases for review,
63
affirming the former case and reversing Gayle.'
In Stovall v. Ford,'64 the court of appeals examined the reparation obligor's right to intervene and assert its subrogation claim
in a case in which the plaintiff and reparation obligee faced a
dismissal of her claims due to a complete release given to the tortISS
/d.

at 870.

635 S.W.2d 482 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981), aff'd sub nom. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v.
Government Employees Ins. Co., 635 S.W.2d 475 (Ky. 1982), cited in Underwood, supra,
note 1, at 280.
110Id. at 484.
', KRS § 304.39-070(3) (1981) does not preclude an action for reimbursement based
on statutory priority, as opposed to fault or the law of torts. See Affiliated FM Ins. Co.
v. Grange Mut. Casualty Co., 641 S.W.2d 49 (Ky. Ct. App. 1982).
"I No. 80-CA-178-D6 (Ky. Ct. App. Sept. 4, 1981), rev'd, Fireman's Fund Ins. Co.
v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 635 S.W.2d at 475.
'6 Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 635 S.W.2d at 475.
,' No. 82-CA-196-MR (Ky. Ct. App. Sept. 10, 1982), modified, No. 82-CA-196-MR
(Ky. Ct. App. Dec. 10, 1982), discretionaryrev. granted, 30 KLS 6, at 14 (Ky. May 4, 1983).
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feasor's insurance agent in return for the sum of $420.60.161 When
the defendant moved for summary judgment, the plaintiff was
unable to establish a triable issue of fact regarding fraud or estoppel
so as to allow her claims to survive the release. 66 Defendant's motion for summary judgment was granted on October 22, 1980, and
made final on October 5, 1981. However, the plaintiff insurer had
moved to intervene in the action on December 3, 1979, after the
motion for summary judgment was filed, but before it was granted.
The trial court dismissed Home Insurance Company's motion to
intervene as untimely but the court of appeals reversed.' 6 7
The court noted that the insurer's exclusive means to recover
basic reparation benefits are intervention or arbitration.' 6 8 In addition, the motion to intervene was filed over ten months before
the summary judgment dismissing the plaintiff's complaint was
granted. The court held that the filing of a motion for summary
judgment does not necessarily prohibit intervention, and that a motion to intervene should not be dismissed as untimely if the rights
of the would-be intervenor would be seriously harmed.' 69 Because
the dismissal of the insured did not involve a determination of the
merits, and because there was no indication that the defendant's
coverage with his insurer had been exhausted by the small settlement made with plaintiff, there was no reason to deny
intervention. '70
Attorneys' fees in subrogation actions were also the subject of
several cases decided in the Survey period. KRS section
304.39-070(5) encourages the basic reparation obligor to use the
injured secured person's (plaintiff's) attorney as its own counsel
in asserting its claim for subrogation.' 7' This procedure has the ad165

Id., slip op. at 1-2, 4-5.

166

In addition, plaintiff did not comply with the pleading requirements of CR 9.02.

See id., slip op. at 2-3.
I6' No. 82-CA-196-MR, slip op. at 7.
261

Id., slip op. at 4-5.

,69 See id., slip op. at 5.
2,0 Id., slip op. at 6.
7
KRS § 304.39-070(5) (1981) provides:
An attorney representing a secured person in any action filed under KRS
304.39-060 shall be entitled to a reasonableattorneys' fee in the event that reparation benefits paid to said secured person by that secured person's reparation
obligor are reimbursed by any insurance carrier on behalf of a tortfeasor who
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vantage of keeping the mention of insurance from the jury.
However, the statute does not prohibit the carrier from choosing
1
its own counsel.' 7
What is a "reasonable fee" for plaintiff's counsel when
separate counsel has been retained by the insurer? In Meridian
Mutual Insurance Company v. Walker,' 7 the injured party collected $6,037.76 in BRB from Meridian, and then pursued recovery
from the tortfeasor. Meridian intervened in that action to assert
its right to subrogation, and hired independent counsel. However,
that attorney's participation in the action was so limited that all
fees for collecting the subrogated amount were awarded to74plaintiff's counsel. The court of appeals affirmed the award.'
In contrast, in the recent case of Woodall v. Grange Mutual
Casualty Company,' 75 independent counsel did not sit idly by,
though much of his assistance was refused by the plaintiff's
counsel, who did not wish to inject insurance into the case at trial
through the presence and participation of Grange Mutual's separate
counsel. Grange Mutual paid its own attorney $1000 for his services. After judgment was entered, the defendant's insurer tendered
a check for $3,724.91 (the BRB previously paid by Grange). 7 6 At
this point plaintiff's counsel, "an attorney representing a secured
person [the plaintiff],"' 7 demanded and was awarded one-third
of this sum as a "mandatory" fee under KRS section 304.39-070.
Although the court of appeals reversed that award after laying
down a series of guidelines to be considered in arriving at a
"reasonable mandatory fee," the Supreme Court affirmed the
award.' 78 Rejecting the court of appeals guidelines, the Supreme
Court held that the amount of fees awarded under the statute
should be set aside only for an abuse of the trial judge's

is the defendant in any such action filed by the said secured person or in the event
such potential "action" is settled by said potential tortfeasor's insurance carrier on his behalf prior to the filing of any such suit.
" See Meridian Mut. Ins. Co. v. Walker, 602 S.W.2d 181, 182 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980).
"7 Id. See also Underwood, supra note 1,at 281.
602 S.W.2d at 183.
"'
648 S.W.2d 871 (Ky. 1983).
" Id. at 872.
KRS § 304.39-070(5) (1981).
"' 648 S.W.2d at 873.
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discretion.' 7 9 The particular award in Woodall was not viewed as
"unreasonable."'' 8 o
A second case involving the application of KRS section
304.39-070(5) arose from an amusing situation in which the same
insurer had insured both the plaintiff and the defendant.'"' After
paying BRB to plaintiff, State Farm moved to intervene to assert
its subrogation rights, only to learn that it was the defendant's insurer. To pursue its subrogation claim would be to pursue itself.
Recognizing that no good could come from such a procedural imbroglio, State Farm moved as intervening plaintiff and intervening defendant to dismiss the intervening complaint.' 8 2 Not surprisingly, an agreed order was entered.' 83 The jury subsequently
awarded plaintiff $10,944.96, of which $3,444.96 represented
medical expenses and lost wages. The trial court then allowed
defendant a credit for $3,135.23, the amount of BRB previously
paid to plaintiff by State Farm.' 4 The problem arose when plaintiff's attorney demanded and received an attorney fee of $1,048.08
pursuant to KRS section 304.39-070(5). Not surprisingly, the court
of appeals concluded the statute was inapplicable in a case in which
5
no reparation benefits are reimbursed.'1
C.

Threshold

In essence, KRS section 304.39-060(2)(a) "abolishes" tort
liability for economic losses payable as BRB (up to $10,000), and
for damages for non-economic losses (pain, suffering, mental
anguish and inconvenience) unless the plaintiff can meet one of
the conditions [the "threshold"] of KRS section 304.39-060(2)(b).' 8 1
In D&B Coal Company v. Farmer,'17 a unanimous Supreme Court
held that a passenger of a motor vehicle on the public roadways
of Kentucky "uses" a motor vehicle and is presumed to have ac-

."

Id.

,soSee id.
S, See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Beard, 636 S.W.2d 26 (Ky. Ct. App. 1982).
's'

Id. at 27.

13 Id.

Id. at 27.
1' Id.
136 KRS § 304.39-060(2)(a),
(b) (Cum. Supp. 1982).
I'
613 S.W.2d 853 (Ky. 1981).
"I
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cepted no fault,' 8 though he or she may not be a "user" of a
motor vehicle as that term is defined by KRS section
304.39-020(15).'" 9 Accordingly, the plaintiff passenger bears the
burden of proving that he or she has filed an appropriate rejection form with the Department of Insurance to avoid the application of provisions of the "no-fault" statute to his or her tort
claims.' 9 D&B Coal Company v. Farmerappears to stand for the
proposition that a passenger must also meet the "threshold" of
KRS section 304.39-060(2)(b),' 9 ' but the recent case of Atkins v.
Schroader'" provides room to question that premise.
In Atkins v. Schroader, Atkins was a passenger in a vehicle
driven by Trabue. She was injured when that vehicle collided with
another driven by Schroader. In her action against Schroader and
Trabue she contended that she was not a "user" of a motor vehicle within the meaning of the Act,' 93 although as a passenger she
was "using" a motor vehicle under the doctrine of D&B Coal Company. Defendant moved for summary judgment on the grounds
that Atkins (1) was "using" a vehicle as a passenger, (2) had not
produced an appropriate rejection form exempting her from "nofault," and (3) had not met the "threshold" requirement of KRS
section 304.39-060(2)(b). The trial court granted the motion.'9
On appeal the court of appeals affirmed in part and reversed
in part. After agreeing with the trial court that the plaintiff was
deemed or presumed to have accepted the provisions of the MVRA,
the court reversed the decision of the trial judge to the extent that
it dismissed all of her claims. 19S Specifically, the court relied on
KRS section 304.39-060(2)(c), which provides that the limitations
on tort liability contained in KRS section 304.39-060(2)(b) [the
"threshold"] do not apply

'

See KRS § 304.39-060(1) (Cum. Supp. 1982).

...The current definition of "user" is found at KRS § 304.39-020(15) (Cum. Supp.
1982). A "user" is defined as "a person who resides in a household in which any person
owns or maintains a motor vehicle." Id.
,9oSee 613 S.W.2d at 854.
9, See Underwood, supra note 1, at 283-84.
"1 29 KLS 14, at 6 (Ky. Ct. App. Nov. 19, 1982), aff'd, 657 S.W.2d 945 (Ky. 1983).
'93 KRS § 304.39-020(15).
"1 29 KLS 14, at 6.
191 Id. at 7.
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for injury to a person who is not an owner, operator, maintainer

or user of a motor vehicle within subsection (1) of this section
[dealing with persons who are deemed to have accepted the act],
nor for injury to the passenger of a motorcycle arising out of
the maintenance or use of such motorcycle. 196
The court concluded that the term "user" in this subsection
must be limited to the class of users described in KRS section

304.39-020(15). In other words, one may "use" a motor vehicle
as a passenger, and be presumed to have accepted no-fault pur-

suant to KRS section 304.39-060(b), but at the same time not meet
the requirements of KRS section 304.39-020(15) and not be a
"user" for purposes of KRS section 304.39-060(2)(c). Such a person would thus not be subject to the threshold requirements. ' 97
In Atkins there was no dispute that the plaintiff was not an

owner, operator, maintainer or "user" of a motor vehicle, within
the meaning of KRS section 304.39-020(15). Accordingly, although
she did not allege in her complaint damages exceeding $10,000 and
could therefore not establish a claim for economic damages
exceeding the maximum for BRB benefits, ' 91she could nevertheless
pursue a claim for non-economic detriment (damages for pain and
suffering), by virtue of KRS section 304.39-060(2)(c), which

exempted her from the "threshold". ' 99

196KRS § 304.39-060(2)(c).

29 KLS 14, at 7.
See KRS § 304.39-060(2)(a) (Cum. Supp. 1982).
,91 This construction of the act is consistent with the former Court of Appeals decision in Fann v. McGuffey, 534 S.W.2d 770, 774 (Ky. Ct. App. 1975). The case can also
be reconciled with D & B Coal Co. v. Farmer, 613 S.W.2d at 853. In the latter case the
Kentucky Supreme Court reversed a plaintiff's judgment for non-economic, as well as
economic damages which led the author to conclude that "a passenger must meet the
threshold." Id. at 854. However, the Court added a footnote which pointed out that plaintiff
had an operator's license, and was therefore subject to the limitations on tort recovery.
Id. at n.3. If this was the reason for the dismissal of all of the plaintiff's claims (including
his successful claim for pain and suffering) it seems odd that this was not set out in the
text of the opinion and made the basis of the Court's decision.

